![]() The new strategy caused an increase, from 12 to 15, of the number of deployable groups built around big-deck carriers. The idea was that, in a war, the Soviet fleet would be pinned down defending its own shores and sea approaches and thus unable to make trouble for US warships in the open ocean, the control of which would be vital to the resupply of allies in Europe and East Asia. The Navy’s Maritime Strategy, formally introduced in the early 1980s, called for carriers to strike an assertive, forward-based stance in key waters around the globe, where they would be poised to go immediately on the offensive against Soviet targets and attack Soviet warships. Getting to the heart of what carriers can actually do requires an honest assessment of their strengths and weaknesses as airpower assets in joint operations. Even so, the 1990s have shown that the big-deck carrier is a specialized airpower asset, not a self-sufficient substitute for land-based airpower. In the past decade, carrier air wings have become more capable, fueling higher demand for carriers in joint operations. Carrier proponents sometimes trash Air Force airpower. Senior officers are guarded in their remarks, but the defense press often picks up and amplifies backstage debates on issues such as the relative effectiveness of carriers and bombers, forward presence, life cycle costs, and the relative merits of new fighter aircraft. The carrier myth has flourished in budget-conscious Washington. This claim gives rise to the notion that advanced stealth aircraft might not be necessary, because the carriers manage to get by without them. In its most extreme form, the myth contains a declaration that aircraft carriers can operate effectively without access to land bases, carry out sustained strikes against targets several hundred miles inland, and generate up to four sorties per strike aircraft per day if the warship and its air wing shift into a surge mode. ![]() In official statements, the Navy claims that “the carrier battle group, operating in international waters, does not need the permission of host countries for landing or overflight rights.” They can operate independently and present “a unique range of options” to the President, the service adds. Nathman, commander of Task Force 50 aboard USS Nimitz in the Gulf, actually declared, “I attribute the cessation of Iraqi no-fly zone violations to our presence” in the area. Carrier effectiveness, though significant, has been inflated to mythic proportions.ĭramatic film footage of carrier-based aircraft being catapulted into the skies frequently dominates televised coverage of periodic US crises with Iraq, even though that image does not reflect actual composition of the joint US force in the region. The carriers have proven their value, but the claims of some carrier proponents frequently defy reality.
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